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EXPANDING THE REACH OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S
AUTOMATIC STAY EXCEPTION: CITY OF NEW
YORK v. EXXON
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code (Code) was developed to protect a
debtor from his or her creditors. The Code provides for a stay of
all actions which have been commenced or could have been com-
menced pre-petition,' and provides exceptions so that the auto-
matic stay does not apply to certain actions. 2 Most courts have
extended the exception to the stay to include actions for the re-
covery of environmental cleanup costs under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). 3 The main purpose of CERCLA is the rapid cleanup
of hazardous waste followed by reimbursement from the respon-
sible party. CERCLA covers all costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion incurred by the United States Government or a state, any
necessary costs of response incurred by a private person, dam-
ages to natural resources and the costs of any health assessment. 4
The Code exists to protect a debtor's estate and insure its
equitable distribution. However, the exception to the stay allows
recovery of costs by a governmental unit exercising its police and
regulatory power. This exception permits an action for the recov-
ery of CERCLA costs which would otherwise be stayed. Thus,
bankruptcy's goal of a true equitable distribution may be in-
fringed upon.
In the recent case of City of New York v. Exxon, 5 the Second
Circuit held that cities, as well as private parties, are exempt from
the automatic stay. Exxon extended the reach of the exception,
permitting even more plaintiffs to recover while a party is in bank-
ruptcy. This note will examine the effect of the expansion of the
automatic stay exception on CERCLA recovery actions. The note
will also examine the applicability of the automatic stay and its use
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). See generally Richard L. Epling, Impact of
Environmental Law on Bankruptcy Cases, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69 (1991).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
5. 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991).
(425)
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by "private" and "public" plaintiffs in light of City of New York v.
Exxon. 6
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA as a response to the tremendous
concern over the severe environmental and public health threat
resulting from improper disposal of hazardous wastes and other
hazardous substances. 7 The statute is designed to facilitate the
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by providing a means of
financing governmental and private responses, and by placing the
ultimate expense on those responsible for the danger." CERCLA
imposes liability for hazardous waste sites on any party who con-
tributes to a hazardous condition in any manner.9 All "potentially
responsible parties"(PRPs)10 could be held liable. CERCLA also
provides for joint and several liability. I I
CERCLA provides that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) can cleanup a hazardous waste site on its own initiative. 12
6. 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991). Private actions are actions brought under
section 9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. This section specifically includes municipali-
ties as private parties. Public actions arise under section 9607(a)(4)(A) of
CERCLA and include states and the federal government. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) & (B) (1988).
7. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9576, at * 16 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074
(1st Cir. 1986); Eagle Pitcher Indus. Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1489 (D.NJ. 1985), aft'd,
777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
8. Nicolet, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9576, at * 16; City of Philadelphia v. Ste-
pan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988); Lynn Manolopoulos, Congressional
Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 UCLAJ. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 73, 76 (1990).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). PRPs include owners, operators, transporters
and generators of waste. Id. See Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Manolopoulos, supra note 9. Under joint
and several liability the full judgement could be brought to bear against one
defendant. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc. 932 F.2d 568, 569-70 (6th Cir.
1991). That defendant would then have a right of contribution from other re-
sponsible parties. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). Thus, the party bringing suit
could recover against whatever responsible party could pay the judgement, even
if one party paid more than its share. Meyer, 932 F.2d at 569. Under this method
the plaintiff is virtually assured of full recovery of its judgement without regard
to which defendants are proportionally responsible. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). Thus, the EPA can cleanup a hazardous waste
site and then bring suit for the reimbursement of its expenses. Where this claim
falls in the priority of bankruptcy claims is a divided question. If the costs are
incurred after the bankruptcy filing, some courts treat the claim as an adminis-
trative expense. Under the Code, administrative expenses are entitled to be paid
2
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Under CERCLA, Congress created a Superfund from which EPA
can draw funds for hazardous waste cleanups.' 3 Superfund was
created from a tax levied on the petroleum and chemical manu-
facturing industries to pay for these cleanups.' 4 However, the
Superfund financing does not make the government solely re-
sponsible for the financial aspects of a hazardous waste cleanup.
CERCLA provides for EPA to obtain reimbursement of its
cleanup costs from PRPs.' 5 This reimbursement is accomplished
by allowing the government to sue the PRPs directly to recover
the costs of cleanup.' 6 Private parties can also bring an action
under CERCLA to recover damages incurred from the cleanup of
hazardous wastes.' 7
B. Bankruptcy Code and the Automatic Stay
Bankruptcy allows a debtor who is insolvent to have the op-
portunity for a "fresh start."' 8 In bankruptcy, the debtor is re-
first. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988); See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Re-
sources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mattiace Indus., Inc.
73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Other courts do not allow treatment of the costs
as an administrative expense and they treat the EPA as a general unsecured
creditor. See In re Wall Tube and Metal Products, 56 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 831 F.2d 118 (1987); Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Lynn Manolopoulos, Con-
gressional Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 UCLAJ.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73 (1990).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988); Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
17. Manolopoulos, supra note 9, at 76; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). A
private party may bring suit to recover only the necessary costs of response con-
sistent with the national contingency plan. Id. A "public" party can recover all
costs not inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
In order for a private person to bring an action under CERCLA: (1) he or
she must fall within one of four categories of covered persons; (2) there must
have been a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from defend-
ant's facility which caused the plaintiff to incur response costs; and (3) the plain-
tiff's costs must be necessary costs of response which are consistent with the
national contingency plan. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989).
18. In re Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.
1991). The "fresh start" occurs when a debtor, after bankruptcy, receives a dis-
charge of all remaining debt. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523-524, 727 (1988). A debtor's
creditors are paid off with whatever assets are left in the debtor's estate to ac-
complish the discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). As a result of the discharge, the
debtor may begin business again without the constraints of overwhelming debt.
When the automatic stay does not apply, a party can obtain a judgement against
the debtor and receive a portion of the estate as reimbursement. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b) (1988).
3
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lieved of his or her duty to pay debts' 9 and his creditors are paid
to the fullest possible extent with whatever assets are in the
debtor's estate.20
Once the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, the debtor is
protected from creditors by the automatic stay provision of the
Code.2' The automatic stay operates as a bar to proceedings 22
and enforcement actions23 to reach the debtor's estate,24 which
include actions against the debtor, the debtor's property and the
property of the estate. However, the state does not apply to acts
against property which is neither the debtor's nor the estate's. 25
The purpose of the automatic stay is to preserve the bankruptcy
19. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). Section 362(a) states as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
ance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgement obtained before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against prop-
erty of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of
the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title against any
claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding
before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (a)(8) (1988). See Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1988). See Manolopoulos, supra note 9. For the
text of § 362(a)(2) see supra note 21.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988); Manolopoulos, supra note 9.
25. United States (EPA) v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 131 B.R.
410, 420 (N.D. Ind. 1991)(citing In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1990); Matter of Precision Color, Inc., 36 B.R. 429 (Bankr. D. Ohio 1984)).
4
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estate and assure equitable liquidation of all debts. 26 Commenta-
tors have noted that the automatic stay's scope is extremely broad
and covers any type of formal or informal action against a debtor
or the property of his estate.27 The relief to the debtor of the
automatic stay is available even against those claims that are later
found to be secured and payable in full. 28
The automatic stay is limited, however, by several excep-
tions,29 enumerated in section 362(b) of the Code.30 The major
exception involving CERCLA is the "police and regulatory
power" exception. 3' This exception states that the automatic stay
does not apply to the "commencement or continuation of an ac-
tion or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such gov-
26. See Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 420; Matter of Holtkamp,
669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Sky Group International, Inc., 108 B.R. 86
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); Matter of Marker Eighty, Inc., 69 B.R. 561 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1987); In re Draggoo Electric Co. Inc., 57 B.R. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
The stay is designed to prevent a race to the courthouse to claim assets in the
debtor's estate. To that end, the stay allows claimants a period of time in which
to file a claim against the estate. The Bankruptcy court then equitably distributes
the assets in the estate according to the priority of the claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 346,
364, 501-52 (1988). This method of distribution allows all claimants to be
treated equally without the award and depletion of the debtor's estate to quick
acting creditors. See Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 420; Matter of
Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Sky Group International, Inc.,
108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); Matter of Marker Eighty, Inc., 69 B.R. 561
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Draggoo Electric Co. Inc., 57 B.R. 916 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1986).
27. See Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 420; In re Wallingsford's
Fruit House, 30 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Matter of Holland, 9 B.R. 228
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
28. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,
271 (3d Cir. 1984). The relief of the stay is allowed for secured claims since it
protects the debtor's estate and assures an equitable and orderly distribution of
the estate. Id. If secured claims were satisfied haphazardly, it would be easier for
problems to develop in the distribution of the debtor's estate.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (b)(5). Sections 362(b)(4) & (b)(5) state as
follows:
(b) The filing of a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title, or of an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not
operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commence-
ment or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmen-
tal unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power;
(5) Under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement
of a judgement, other than a money judgement, obtained in an ac-
tion or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such govern-
mental unit's police or regulatory power;
Id.
30. For the text of § 362(a)(4) see supra note 21.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988).
19921 429
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ernmental unit's police or regulatory power."3 2 Governmental
entities have used this exception to the automatic stay to bring
several types of actions against debtors who have entered
bankruptcy.3 3
The use of the police and regulatory exception to the auto-
matic stay is limited, however, to cases that seek to create or en-
force a non-money judgment.3 4 Section 362(b)(5) creates an
"exception to the exception" since actions to enforce a money
judgment are still barred by the automatic stay even if accom-
plished pursuant to a state's police powers.3 5 The definition of
the term "money judgment" has been a source of much contro-
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988). See also Environmental Waste Control Inc.,
131 B.R. at 421; Matter of Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v.
Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 700 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Beker
Indus., 57 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Standard Metals
Corp., 49 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
The inapplicability of the automatic stay does not necessarily provide for
full reimbursement costs. As the court in Exxon stated, the lifting of the stay only
provides for the entering of a money judgement, not for the enforcement of
such ajudgement. See City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991).
Thus, even though a judgement could be obtained, its enforcement would be
denied and the plaintiff would not receive money. When entered, the money
judgement will be dischargeable as a "claim" in bankruptcy. In re Chateaugay
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
33. See e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988)(auto-
matic stay does not apply to action brought for cleanup reimbursement under
CERCLA); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267
(3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mattiace Indus., Inc., 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y.
1987)(CERCLA action excepted from automatic stay).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). See also City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1991). A police power money judgement is one obtained under
section 362(b)(4) such as a specific amount of money to be paid for environmen-
tal cleanup reimbursement. Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). See also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272.
The legislative history of section 362(b)(5) clarifies the scope of the "excep-
tion to the exception." That history states as follows:
Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends to permit an
injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the entry of
a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a
money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession of
the bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all
creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a government unit of a
money judgment would give it preferential treatment to the detriment
of all other creditors.
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5838; H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 6299. The Exxon court agreed in stating that the lifting of
the stay only provides for the entering of a money judgement, not for the en-
forcement of such a judgement. City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d
Cir. 1991).
6
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versy.3 6 Some courts have held that only a definite fixed sum
could be a money judgment, while others hold that any order
which requires the expenditure of funds is a money judgment. 37
The purpose of the governmental legal action must also be
ascertained before the exception to the stay will be permitted. To
that end, the purpose must be for the conservation of public
health, safety, or welfare. 38 The automatic stay will remain in ef-
fect if the focus of the police power is solely on the debtor's finan-
cial obligations rather than health and safety concerns. 39 If the
focus is on money, section 362(b)(4) will not apply and the stay
will be enforced under section 362(b)(5). 40
Whether government suits for the recovery of response costs
fall under the police power exception to the automatic stay will
determine if such suits may be commenced. If the exception is
allowed, suits may proceed to judgment without delay.4' How-
ever, if the automatic stay still applies, the claim is stayed and is
most likely dischargeable in bankruptcy. 42
36. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274; United States v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985).
37. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274; United States v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985).
38. See, e.g., Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 421; Matter of Com-
monwealth Oil Refining Co. Inc., 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1005 (1987); United States v. Mattiace Indus., Inc., 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
39. See, e.g., Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 421; In re Sampson,
17 B.R. 528 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Md.
1981). This division arises because if the government is suing to recover a
"money judgment" section 362(b)(5) will keep the stay intact. However, if the
government suit is to protect the public health, (i.e. protect persons from the
present danger of a hazardous site) the action would not be deemed brought to
enforce a money judgment and the automatic stay would not apply.
The definition of "money judgment" has been difficult for many courts to
determine. Some courts have held that only a definite fixed sum could be a
money judgment while others hold that any order which requires the expendi-
ture of funds is a money judgment. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274; United States
v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
40. See, e.g., Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 421; In re Sampson,
17 B.R. 528 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Md.
1981).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (b)(5).
42. The applicability of the automatic stay would prevent a suit under
CERCLA from proceeding to judgment. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). Without ajudgment the party would most likely not have a "claim" which is enforceable in
the bankruptcy proceeding, leaving the costs of the cleanup to be wholly dis-
charged. See In re Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.
1991); Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274; United States v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
If the stay is inapplicable, however, a party may receive a judgment in its favor
and then present such judgment in the bankruptcy court. See United States v.
19921
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C. CERCLA and the Automatic Stay
The law concerning the application of the automatic stay to
CERCLA cost recovery actions has been uniformly applied.
Courts have generally held that a CERCLA action is an exercise
of the government's police or regulatory power and is not subject
to the automatic stay.43 The main thrust of the case law regarding
the exception to the stay is that if the governmental agency is act-
ing to protect the public interest and not from a purely pecuniary
perspective, the exception to the stay will be permitted. If the
purpose of the governmental unit's action is to protect the state's
pecuniary interest, the exception will not apply.4 4 However, all of
the cases which have been decided to date have involved the en-
forcement of the exception by a state or by the United States Gov-
ernment. 45 No court has ruled on the enforcement of the stay by a
city under CERCLA.46
In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources,47 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
exception to the automatic stay should be applied broadly so as to
afford states the maximum use of its police and regulatory
power.48 The "exception to the exception" of section 362(b)(5)
was construed narrowly to limit the application of the stay strictly
to actions enforcing a money judgment.49 The court reasoned
that an order to cleanup a hazardous waste site was an "obvious
exercise of the state's power to protect the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the public." 50 The court also decided that the relief sought
was not a strict money judgment, but an injunction "meant to
Mattiace Indus., 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). This method allows the govern-
mental unit to recover at least a portion of its cleanup costs under CERCLA.
43. See generally Richard L. Epling, Impact of Environmental Law on Bankruptcy
Cases, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 84 (1991).
44. See In Re Nejberger, 112 B.R. 714 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). These are considered "public" par-
ties under § 9607(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA.
46. An action by a city under CERCLA is argued in Exxon by Refinement to
be a strictly "private" action. Under this theory the governmental exception to
the automatic stay could not apply, and the action for reimbursement could not
be brought.
47. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 273. Penn Terra was decided under various state environmental
statutes. Id. However, the decision regarding the automatic stay is applicable to
CERCLA actions.
49. Id. at 273. However, even if the automatic stay is inapplicable, the bank-
ruptcy court may, in its discretion, issue an appropriate injunction applying the
stay. Id.
50. Id. at 274.
8
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prevent future harm to, and to restore, the environment. ' 5 1
Therefore, this action was properly deemed an exercise of the po-
lice and regulatory power and not subject to the automatic stay. 52
Similarly, in United States v. MacKay,53 the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, while implying that the police
power exception to the automatic stay was a narrow one, never-
theless held that the exception to the stay applied in actions
under CERCLA to recover response costs. 54 This was the first
court to directly address the issue of the application of the auto-
matic stay to an action under CERCLA for reimbursement of haz-
ardous waste site cleanup costs. 55 The court relied solely on the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to find that the
automatic stay was inapplicable. 56
MacKay was reinforced one year later by the court in United
States v. Mattiace Industries, Inc..57 Mattiace also involved the appli-
cation of the stay to an action under CERCLA. 58 While conceding
that the exception to the stay applied to an action for injunctive
relief and fines, the debtor argued that to the extent reimburse-
ment for response costs were sought, the exception did not apply
since such an action would be stayed by the "pecuniary interests"
rule.59 The court noted that the pecuniary interests doctrine had
never been applied to an action under CERCLA and ruled that,
since a CERCLA action is by its very nature for the protection of
51, Id. at 278.
52. Id.
53. No. 85 C 6925, slip op. (N.D. Ill. January 17, 1986).
54. Id. at 3.
55. MacKay involved a suit brought by the United States to recover the
costs of stabilizing hazardous waste storage trailers. Id. Defendant MacKay
sought to have the action stayed due to the filing of a petition for involuntary
bankruptcy. Id.
56. Id. at 4. The legislative history states as follows:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions
and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory
powers. Thus, where a government unit is suing a debtor to prevent or
stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection,
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages
for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under
the automatic stay.
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 1978; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 343, 1978; reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838, 6299 (emphasis
added).
57. 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
58. Id.
59. Aattiace, 73 B.R. at 818. The pecuniary interests rule states that if the
only purpose for the government action is to protect its pecuniary interests, then
the action will be stayed notwithstanding the exception to the automatic stay.
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the public health and welfare, the exception will control. 60
Similarly, in United States v. Nicolet, Inc. ,61 the Third Circuit
held the exception to the automatic stay applicable to CERCLA
actions by the United States to recover costs expended and to be
expended in the future for the cleanup of an asbestos site.62 After
the suit for recovery was filed, Nicolet filed for bankruptcy. 63 The
EPA then sought to have the proceedings declared exempt from
the automatic stay of section 362. 64 The court reasoned that
merely reducing the claim to judgment would not be an imper-
missible enforcement of a money judgment under section
362(b)(5) of the Code.65 The court went on to declare that since
the United States was suing not to redress a private wrong but to
protect the health, welfare and safety of the public under
CERCLA and its police and regulatory power, the exception to
the automatic stay would ensure that the responsible parties
would be held liable for environmental wrongs.66 To that end the
court stated "it was Congress' intent that proceedings such as this
be exempt from the automatic stay up to and including the entry
of a monetary judgment." 6 7
Several cases demonstrate the limitations on the exception to
the automatic stay. In United States (EPA) v. Environmental Waste
Control, Inc.,68 a private citizens group sought a declaration that
the automatic stay did not apply due to the applicability of the
362(b)(4) exception. 69 The court denied the motion, reasoning
that actions by private citizens can not benefit from the stay ex-
ception of 362(b)(4) even if the judgment sought would be paya-
ble to the government. 70 The court retained the narrow focus of
60. Id. at 819.
61. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 203.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 210. The court indicated that without the exception
to the automatic stay, entities could simply violate the law, seek protection under
the bankruptcy code, and thus never be held responsible for its environmental
damage. Id.
67. Id.
68. 131 B.R. 410 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
69. The citizens group sought the exception to the stay since the proceeds
of any suit would be payable to the government and in essence the citizens
group was equal to a governmental plaintiff. Id.
70. Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 422 (citing In re Revere
Copper and Brass, Inc., 29 B.R. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 32 B.R. 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
10
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the stay limiting it to "governmental authorities seeking to en-
force regulations violated by the debtor." 7'
In United States v. Seitles,72 the Bankruptcy court found the ex-
ception to the automatic stay inapplicable when there was no
threat of harm to the public. 73 The court determined that absent
the presence of continuing harm or the threat of harm, the stay
must be enforced.74 The decision turned on the fact that without
an act purporting to protect the public from harm, there was no
need for an exception to the continuance of the stay. 75
1. Cities and the Automatic Stay
Although courts have not ruled on the city-state issue in the
bankruptcy context, several courts have reviewed this issue in a
strict CERCLA only action. For example, in Mayor and Board of
Aldermen v. Drew Chemical Corp. ,76 the District Court of New Jersey
held that a city would be encompassed in the definition of a state
under section 9607(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA. The court reasoned that
while a strict reading of the statute would exclude a city from
9607(a)(4)(A), such a conclusion would undermine CERCLA's
goals. 77 The court relied on the legislative history and a broad
reading of the term "state" to allow the city to bring suit under
71. Environmental Waste Control Inc., 131 B.R. at 422.
72. 106 B.R. 36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 742 F.
Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
73. While Seitles involved the False Claims Act, its interpretation of the au-
tomatic stay is applicable to all cases involving section 362(b)(4).
74. Id. at 39. The court used the pecuniary interests test and the public
policy test to determine whether the stay applied. Under the pecuniary interests
test the court found that the government's interest was of a monetary nature,
not of a motive involving public safety. Id. Under the public policy test, the
court relied on the reasoning of the courts in the Chateaugay, and Wellham cases.
Those cases state that while the government could articulate a public policy rea-
son, it was not necessarily the primary motivation for continuing the action. In
re Chateaugay, 115 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) aff'd 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1991); In re Wellham, 53 B.R. 195 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). As a result, the
court found the exception to the stay did not apply. Seitles, 106 B.R. at 39.
75. Seitles 106 B.R. at 39.
76. 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
77. Id. The policy of CERCLA would be undermined because the Act was
enacted to allow for the efficient cleanup of hazardous waste. See Nicolet, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9576, at * 16; City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982). If the court allowed only a state to sue,
then only a state could cleanup hazardous wastes. This conclusion would leave a
city with the difficult task of attempting a cleanup as a private party. If the city is
treated as a private party it would not receive the benefit of the exception and
would be out of court. See supra note 66. CERCLA certainly was not enacted to
protect only "state waste" as opposed to "city waste." Its purpose was and is to
clean up all hazardous waste as efficiently as possible.
1992] 435
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9607(a)(4)(A).78
After the decision in Drew Chemical, two cases disagreed with
the District Court of New Jersey. In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co., 79 the court read section 9607(a)(4)(A) strictly and
excluded a city from the definition of a state. The court specifi-
cally disagreed with Drew Chemical, finding no support for a broad-
ening of (a)(4)(A) in either the strict statutory reading or the
legislative history. Similarly, in Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Corp. ,80
the United States District Court for Massachusetts held that the
"primary focus must be on the statute itself""' and thus a city
could not come under the term state. 82
The recent decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in City of New York v. Exxon,83 extended the protection from the
automatic stay to a city in the exercise of its police and regulatory
power. Exxon also was the first case to extend the exception to the
automatic stay to cases brought under both section
78. Id.
79. 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
80. 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass. 1991).
81. Id. at 475. The court held that any interpretation of the statute must
come from a strict and direct reading of the statute. Id. As a result, the court
would simply not permit any outside evidence or inferences to bear on its
interpretation.
82. The court viewed as contollingJudge Ditter's comment in Stepan Chemi-
cal, that there is "a concern on the part of Congress that unwise and excessive
cleanup activity be restrained." 713 F. Supp. at 1488 n. 12. This allowed the
court to dismiss the policy arguments of Drew Chemical and Exxon.
83. 932 F.2d 1020 (2nd Cir. 1991).
12
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9607(a)(4)(A) 84 and section 9607(a)(4)(B) 8 5 of CERCLA. 86
While a city has the same interests as a state in protecting the
public health and safety, CERCLA treats a city as it would a pri-
vate citizen.8 7 This difference seems to make it more important to
protect a state's citizens than for a city to protect its citizens. 88 In
permitting a city to sue as a state, the court eliminates this dichot-
omy and permits the goals of CERCLA to be served. This exten-
sion of protection to cities themselves will allow all governmental
units to obtain a judgement for CERCLA cleanup costs against a
bankrupt debtor.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of City of New York
In City of New York, the City brought suit against Refinemet
Corporation and fourteen other defendants under CERCLA to
recover the costs of removing hazardous wastes generated by the
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) states as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(4) any person who accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites se-
lected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrance of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not incon-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) states as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(4) any person who accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites se-
lected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrance of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for-
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan.
Id.
86. The difference between public and private is generally important in that
a private party (one under section 9607(a)(4)(B)) could not use the police power
exception. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
87. As written and according to the legislative history, section
9607(a)(4)(B) would encompass municipalities such an New York, while section
9607(a)(4)(A) would include states and the United States Government, but not
cities.
88. The Exxon court overlooked this distinction and looked to bankruptcy
law as determinative of the application of the automatic stay.
4371992]
13
Chiacchiere: Expanding the Reach of the Bankruptcy Code's Automatic Stay Excep
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
438 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 425
defendants from its landfills. 89 The City claimed that the defend-
ants hired wastehauling companies who illegally dumped at the
landfills.90
The City sought recovery pursuant to CERCLA section
9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) for the costs incurred and to be incurred in
the future for the removal of these hazardous wastes from the
landfills.9 1 In October of 1987, Refinemet filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.92 In September of
1989, the City moved for summary judgment on Refinemet's lia-
bility for the landfill cleanup costs. 93 On March 30, 1990, the dis-
trict court, finding the automatic stay inapplicable to the City's
action, granted the City's summary judgment motion. 94
Refinemet appealed on several issues, including the holding that
the automatic stay did not apply to the City's recovery action. 95
89. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1022.
90. Id. The operator of one of the wastehauling companies, Russel Mahler,
had bribed a city sanitation officer to gain access to the dumpsite. Id. In addition
to generating some of these wastes, defendant Refinemet wholly owned one of
the wastehauling companies, Newtown Refining Corporation, during the period
that Newtown was dumping waste in the City's landfills illegally. Id.
91. Id. at 1022. The City also sought a declaratory judgement under
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) that Refinemet was liable for future costs of investiga-
tions and remedial action at the sites, and damage to natural resources under
§ 9607(a)(4)(C). Id. In June 1985, Refinemet moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction; this motion to dismiss was denied along with
the other defendants' dismissal motions. Id. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp.
(Exxon I), 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
92. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1022. The bankruptcy filing was made in the district
court for the Central District of California. Id. The action was then "referred" to
the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) Id. In June 1988, the City filed a
timely proof of claim in the California bankruptcy proceeding and informed the
court of its New York recovery action. Id. at 1023. On November 23, 1988,
Judge Conboy approved a consent judgement settling the suit against seven de-
fendants. Id. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp.(Exxon II), 697 F.Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). In May 1989, two more consent judgements were approved
against six other defendants leaving only Refinemet and Alcan Aluminum Cor-
poration as defendants. Id.
93. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1023. The City made this motion in New York. Id.
After obtaining several adjournments to the motion, Refinemet moved in the
California proceeding for a determination of its liability under CERCLA. Id.
Refinemet followed that motion with a letter to the district court in the New
York action that asked the court to "strike" the City's summary judgement mo-
tion. Id. The City responded under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) by moving to withdraw
those parts of the California Chapter 11 proceeding which dealt with the City's
CERCLA claims to the New York district court. Id.
94. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1023. The court also enjoined the parties from liti-
gating the remaining damage issues in the California bankruptcy proceeding and
denied the City's motion to withdraw the California court's reference on juris-
dictional grounds. Id. See City of New York v. Exxon, 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). It is this order from which Refinemet appealed.
95. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1023. The issues of liability and the legality of the
14
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The Second Circuit found that the City's action was clearly within
the scope of the exception to the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code. 96
B. Analysis
The Second Circuit relied almost exclusively on the legisla-
tive history of section 362(b)(4) 97 in finding that the automatic
stay was inapplicable to environmental actions under CERCLA. 98
The court noted that the availability of a reimbursement action
encouraged a quick response to environmental crisis by a govern-
ment, which it termed a "direct exercise of a government's police
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens." 99 The
court, citing the rationale of Seitles, emphasized the need to con-
tinue effective deterrent actions during the pendency of the bank-
ruptcy petition. This deterrent aspect is consistent with the
enforcement of police or regulatory powers.100 These actions fur-
thered the purpose of the regulatory exemption to the automatic
stay: to avoid the frustration of necessary governmental functions
by refuge of the debtor in bankruptcy court.' 0 '
Refinemet argued that actions for cleanup costs were subdi-
vided between "public" actions under section 9607(a)(4)(A) and
"private" actions under section 9607(a)(4)(B). I02 Refinemet
claimed that "public" plaintiffs are limited to the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe, while plaintiffs under
subsection (B) can be any person, including municipalities.10 3
Subsection (A) allows for recovery of all costs of removal that are
"not inconsistent with the national contingency plan" while sub-
injunction against further litigation in the California proceeding were also ap-
pealed. City of New York v. Exxon, 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). They are not
considered for purposes of this Note.
96. City of New York v. Exxon, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991).
97. The legislative history explicitly stated that action to prevent or fix dam-
ages for a violation of environmental protection is excepted from the automatic
stay. For the text of the legislative history see supra note 56.
98. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1024.
99. Id.
100. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1024.
101. Id. The allowance of suit for the recovery of costs allows the city or
state to cleanup a site freely without worry of reimbursement. The deterrent
effect derives from the fact that a polluter cannot simply file for bankruptcy and
be free of the damage. The responsibility for environmental damage continues
to be his or her responsibility. Presumably when one knows he will always be
responsible for his actions he will attempt to restrict and stop them. See discus-
sion of Seitles supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
102. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1025.
103. Id.
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section (B) limits recovery to "any other necessary costs of re-
sponse" which are consistent with the national contingency
plan.10 4 Refinemet argued that the action by the City must be
deemed an action by a person under subsection (B) since the City
was acting in its own interest in cleaning up the property, and a
"public" subsection (A) action is only available to the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe.' 0 5 Thus,
Refinemet argued that the City's action should not be deemed a
"public" action to enforce its police and regulatory power, and
the exception to the automatic stay should not apply.' 0 6
The Exxon court dismissed Refinemet's argument that since
the action was brought under section 9607(a)(4)(B) 0 7 of
CERCLA and was thus a "private" action by a person for the
"necessary costs of response," the exception to the automatic stay
did not apply.' 0 8 The court reasoned that for CERCLA actions it
is not important under what section the action is brought, only
what entity is bringing it and for what purpose. 10 9 The court ruled
that section 362(b)(4) of the Code controlled rather than section
9607(a)(4)(A) or (B) of CERCLA. i t0 The court adopted a broad
definition of governmental unit without regard to the form of the
unit." ' 1 According to the court, all that was necessary was that the
suit "be one that 'enforce[s]' that governmental unit's 'police or
regulatory powers.' " 112
The court's reasoning relates to what most courts have held
regarding the automatic stay." 3 The court looks more to the en-
tity bringing the suit (governmental or private) and the purpose,
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c). The national contingency plan describes ap-
proved methods of responding to the release of hazardous waste.
105. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1025.
106. Id.
107. For the text of § 9607(a)(4)(A) & (B) see supra notes 84-85.
108. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1025.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court looked to Bankruptcy law since the issue was the applica-
bility of the automatic stay, an issue that arises in bankruptcy proceedings. The
court also used the Code since in doing so the policy behind both CERCLA and
the exception would be possible. Id. A strict reading under CERCLA would actu-
ally prevent the aims of CERCLA from being enforced since a city might be
prevented from protecting its citizens from environmental waste if it was treated
as a private party. As a result the court's interpretation accomplished the goals
of both the stay and CERCLA in protecting a governmental unit's citizens from
environmental waste.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of the previous courts' reasoning see supra notes 47-
75 and accompanying text.
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rather than the requirements of section 9607(a). This rationale is
similar to the theory behind Penn Terra 114, MacKay 15, Mattiace 116,
and Nicolet 17 in that the relevant inquiry is whether the action in
recovery goes to protect the public health, welfare and safety." 8
In Exxon, the cleanup of the site was obviously to protect the pub-
lic. Thus, the stay could be deemed for the benefit of the public
welfare and not limited as a mere pecuniary interest.
These previous cases have not dealt with the issue of a city
suing for reimbursement for costs incurred in cleaning up a haz-
ardous waste site. The cases have only considered a state or the
United States Government as plaintiff. A dearth of direct case law
exists on the argument proposed by Refinemet. It is logical, how-
ever, that the decision reached by the Exxon court follows from
Drew Chemical" 9 and the automatic stay cases. The court was
more concerned with protecting public health than the identity of
the governmental unit which had brought the suit. The court rec-
ognized that had it accepted Refinemet's argument it would be
put in the position of allowing the protection of the public by a
state but not by a "mere" city. In reaching its decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit disavowed the strict reading of the statute applied by
the Stepan Chemical and Town of Bedford courts. ' 2 0
The result reached under Stepan Chemical and Town of Bedford
is patently absurd and would clearly frustrate the purpose of
CERCLA and the Code's automatic stay exception. In treating a
city as the same type of plaintiff as a state, both CERCLA's goal of
environmental cleanup and the exception to the automatic stay's
goal of protecting the police power are accomplished. Allowing a
city to sue will deter a "would be" violator and foster the aims of
both CERCLA and the exception to the automatic stay of the
Bankruptcy Code. ' 2 '
114. 733 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984).
115. No. 85 C 6925, slip op. (N.D. Ill. January 17, 1986).
116. 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
117. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
118. For a discussion of these cases, see accompanying text and notes 47-
67 supra.
119. 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985).
120. Exxon, 932 F.2d at 1025; Stepan Chemical, 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Town of Bedford, 755 F. Supp. 469 (D. Mass. 1991).
121. The aims of CERCLA, namely to protect the public welfare and safety,
are met since the suit is allowed to proceed. The Bankruptcy Code's aim of pro-
tecting actions under a governmental unit's police and regulatory power is also
met since the action of a governmental unit, a city, is now excepted from the
action of the automatic stay.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The state of reimbursement actions under CERCLA has been
enhanced by the inclusion of cities and other § 9607(a)(4)(B) par-
ties in the scope of the automatic stay exception. This decision
opens up an entirely new group of parties that may bring actions
under CERCLA and avoid the automatic stay. Governmental
units, including municipalities, can now have environmental is-
sues tried outside the scope of the bankruptcy courts. If the action
was brought under the governmental unit's police and regulatory
power, it can be continued while the defendant is in bankruptcy.
The court has retained the well known environmental excep-
tion to the automatic stay and expanded its reach. This expansion
can only help the public at large while further frustrating the
availability of a "fresh start." However, this frustration must be
balanced against the conflicting purpose of CERCLA. In Exxon
the Second Circuit has placed CERCLA and the safety of the pub-
lic above the protection of the insolvent debtor.
Mark D. Chiacchiere
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